Research

One strand of my research addresses issues of method and confirmation as they arise in particular biological controversies. I have written about the problem of defining biological individuality, the role of developmental plasticity in evolution, and different mechanisms for explaining the evolution of sexual preferences. I am now developing the general implications of my research for (a) underdetermination and (b) scientific disagreement.

Another other substantial part of my research is in environmental philosophy. My projects here range from analyses of the effectiveness of different kinds of environmental interventions to both normative and applied work related to public understanding of and participation in science.

Below you will find information about my publications and work in progress. You can read more about my collaborative work here.

Selected Publications

Kovaka, K. “Meta-Analysis and Conservation Science.” Forthcoming, Philosophy of Science. [pdf]

Abstract: Philosophical work on meta-analysis occurs exclusively in the context of biomedical research and revolves around a single question: Is meta-analytic evidence the best kind of evidence? I contribute to the epistemology of meta-analysis by identifying distinctive questions and puzzles that arise for meta-analysis in the context of conservation science, and I argue that philosophers should broaden their lens for studying this fascinating research method.research and revolves around a single question: Is meta-analytic evidence the best kind of evidence? I contribute to the epistemology of meta-analysis by identifying distinctive questions and puzzles that arise for meta-analysis in the context of conservation science, and I argue that philosophers should broaden their lens for studying this fascinating research method.

Kovaka, K. 2021. “Fighting About Frequency.” Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03139-y. [pdf]

Abstract: Scientific disputes about how often different processes or patterns occur are relative frequency controversies. These controversies occur across the sciences. In some areas—especially biology—they are even the dominant mode of dispute. Yet they depart from the standard picture of what a scientific controversy is like. In fact, standard philosophical accounts of scientific controversies suggest that relative frequency controversies are irrational or lacking in epistemic value. This is because standard philosophical accounts of scientific controversies often assume that in order to be rational, a scientific controversy must (a) reach a resolution and (b) be about a scientifically interesting question. Relative frequency controversies rarely reach a resolution, however, and some scientists and philosophers are skeptical that these controversies center on scientifically interesting questions. In this paper, I provide a novel account of the epistemic contribution that relative frequency controversies make to science. I show that these controversies are rational in the sense of further- ing the epistemic aims of the scientific communities in which they occur. They do this despite rarely reaching a resolution, and independent of whether the controversies are about scientifically interesting questions. This means that assumptions (a) and (b) about what is required for a controversy to be rational are wrong. Controversies do not need to reach a resolution in order to be rational. And they do not need to be about anything scientifically interesting in order to make valuable epistemic contributions to science.

Kovaka, K. 2021. “Evaluating Community Science.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.05.004. [pdf]

Abstract: Community science—scientific investigation conducted partly or entirely by non-professional scientists—has many advantages. For example, community science mobilizes large numbers of volunteers who can, at low cost, collect more data than traditional teams of professional scientists. Participation in research can also increase volunteers’ knowledge about and appreciation of science. At the same time, there are worries about the quality of data that community science projects produce. Can the work of non-professionals really deliver trustworthy results? Attempts to answer this question generally compare data collected by volunteers to data collected by professional scientists. When volunteer data is more variable or less accurate than professionally collected data, then the community science project is judged to be inferior to traditional science. I argue that this is not the right standard to use when evaluating community science, because it relies on a false assumption about the aims of science. I show that if we adopt the view that science has diverse aims which are often in tension with one another, then we cannot justify holding community science data to an expert accuracy standard. Instead, we should evaluate the quality of community science data based on its adequacy-for-purpose.

Kovaka, K. 202o. “Mate choice mechanisms and null models.” Philosophy of Science. DOI: 10.1086/710614. [pdf]

Abstract: Biologists have proposed a variety of explanations for extravagant sexual displays, and controversies over explanations define the history of sexual selection research. Recently, Richard Prum has defended Darwin’s idea that the evolution of sexual displays is driven by arbitrary and non-adaptive preferences of potential mates. Prum argues that this explanation should be the null model for sexual selection research. I show that if we adopted Prum’s proposal, the inferences we could be justified in making are more modest than he claims. I also discuss problems with estimating model parameters that at present prevent his proposal from being useful in practice.

Kovaka, K. 2019. “Climate change denial and beliefs about science.” Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02210-z. [pdf]

Abstract:  Social scientists have offered a number of explanations for why Americans commonly deny that human-caused climate change is real. In this paper, I argue that these explanations neglect an important group of climate change deniers: those who say they are on the side of science while also rejecting what they know most climate scientists accept. I then develop a “nature of science” hypothesis that does account for this group of deniers. According to this hypothesis, people have serious misconceptions about what scientific inquiry ought to look like. Their misconceptions interact with partisan biases to produce denial of human-caused climate change. After I develop this hypothesis, I propose ways of confirming that it is true. Then I consider its implications for efforts to combat climate change denial and for other cases of public rejection of science.  

Kovaka, K. 2017. "Underdetermination and evidence in the developmental plasticity debate." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axxo38 [pdf]

Abstract: I identify a controversial hypothesis in evolutionary biology called the plasticity-first hypothesis. I argue that the plasticity-first hypothesis is underdetermined and that the most popular means of studying the plasticity-first hypothesis are insufficient to confirm or disconfirm it. I offer a strategy for overcoming this problem. Researchers need to develop a richer middle range theory of plasticity-first evolution that allows them to identify distinctive empirical traces of the hypothesis. They can then use those traces to discriminate between rival explanations of evolutionary episodes. The best tools for developing such a middle range theory are experimental evolution and formal modeling.  

Kovaka, K. 2015 “Biological individuality and scientific practice.” Philosophy of Science 82(5):1092- 1103. [pdf]

Abstract: I consider the relationship between scientific practice and the philosophical debate surrounding biological individuality. I argue for the sensitivity account, on which biologists do not require a resolution to the individuality debate. This view puts me in disagreement with much of the literature on biological individuality, where it has become common to claim that there is a relationship of dependence between biologists’ conceptions of individuality and the quality of their empirical work.

Work in progress

“Relative Frequency Controversies and the Growth of Biological Knowledge,” with Rose Novick (under review)

“Environmental Interference.” (in preparation)

“What is Meta-Analysis Good For.” (in preparation)

“Climate Adaptation and Privileging the ‘Natural,’” with Kate Nicole Hoffman (in preparation)